The cyclical behavior of hours worked, wages, and consumption does not conform with the predictions of the representative agent model with standard preferences. The residual in the intra-temporal first-order condition for commodity consumption and leisure is often viewed as a failure of labor-market clearing. We demonstrate that a simple heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete markets and indivisible labor generates an aggregation error that looks very much like the preference residual observed in the aggregate data. Our results caution against viewing the preference residual as a failure of labor-market clearing, or as a fundamental driving force of business cycles.
Introduction
The equilibrium outcome of the representative-agent model with standard preferences is hard to reconcile with the joint behavior of aggregate hours worked, consumption, and wages over the business cycle (Barro and King, 1984; Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers, 1989) .
A significant residual in preference is measured when an accounting method that uses the optimality condition for the choice between consumption and leisure is introduced (e.g., Hall, 1997) . This is often viewed as a failure of the labor-market clearing.
In this paper we show that, when capital market is incomplete and labor supply is indivisible, an economy where agents have identical preferences, but heterogeneous productivity, can generate an aggregation error that looks like an aggregate preference shock. Although there are no inherent preference shifts, in the face of aggregate technology shocks, the model generates an aggregation error that is comparable to the preference residual in the data: that is highly correlated with hours worked, and as volatile as the cyclical component of hours. Our results caution against viewing the preference residual as a failure of labor-market clearing, or as a fundamental driving force of business cycles.
Our analysis quantitatively complements the theoretical work by Sheinkman and Weiss (1986) , who show that capital-market incompleteness can lead to a stochastic term in aggregate preferences. It also complements Nakajima (2003) who derives aggregate preference shocks and TFP variation in a two-type household model with capacity utilization and government spending shocks. According to our model, however, an incomplete capital market alone cannot generate an aggregation error that is quantitatively comparable to the preference residual observed in the data. With divisible labor, hours are highly correlated across households in response to aggregate shocks, thus allowing for a fairly good aggregation.
On the other hand, with indivisible labor (Rogerson, 1988; Hansen, 1985) , the intratemporal optimality condition for the choice between commodity consumption and leisure does not hold as equality at the individual level. While this is also true when the capital market is complete, at the aggregate level the consumption-leisure choice holds exactly in efficiency units under a complete market. An efficient allocation requires the marginal utility of aggregate consumption from the effective labor supplied by an additional worker being equal to the marginal dis-utility of his leisure. This implies that, under a complete market, the preference residual reflects a composition bias only in the measurement of aggregate wages and hours (e.g., Bils, 1985; Solon, Barsky and Parker, 1989; Hansen, 1993) . This compositional bias has an impact mostly on the magnitudes, not the correlations-in other words, the compositional bias changes the slope of the conventionally measured Frisch laborsupply curve. However, in the data, the preference residual arises not only because the hours worked move little relative to wages, but also because there is no strong correlation with the measured price of leisure.
In addition to aggregation errors, a combination of an incomplete capital market and indivisible labor results in the magnification of the aggregate preference residual. The participation margin makes the aggregate labor supply more elastic, consumption fluctuates more over the length of the business cycle, as the household's expenditures depend on the employment status and current income, and the aggregate labor-supply curve itself is time-varying as the shape of reservation-wage distribution changes over time.
The paper is organized in the following fashion. Section 2 briefly discusses the preference residual in the aggregate data. Section 3 lays out a benchmark model economy in which the capital market is incomplete and labor supply is indivisible. In Section 4, we calibrate the model economy and compare the aggregate preference residual from the model to the one found in the data. In Section 5, we investigate the economies with and without the complete market and indivisible labor, in order to distinguish the role of market incompleteness and indivisible labor. Section 6 is the conclusion.
Preference Residual in Aggregate Data
One of the leading topics in macroeconomics is the identification of the fundamental driving forces behind economic fluctuations. Economists adopt accounting procedures that combine aggregate time series data with the equilibrium conditions of a prototype model. A prominent example of this is the Solow residual. Under certain assumptions about market competition and the production function, shifts in technology are identified (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982) . 1 Likewise, the standard optimality condition on the choice between commodity consumption and leisure (along with the assumption that household efforts are paid for by their marginal product) identifies the preference residual (e.g., Hall, 1997) . To illustrate, consider a representative agent who maximizes utility under a competitive labor market:
where β is the discount factor, C t is consumption, and H t is hours worked. 2 The parameter γ represents the compensated labor-supply elasticity and B is the utility parameter. Given the real wage rate W t , hours worked and consumption satisfy the intra-temporal first-order
1 The Solow residual is subject to specification errors because of such factors as, imperfect competition, cyclical utilization, and aggregation across firms (e.g., Hall, 1987) .
2 While this form of utility is popular in both business cycle analysis and empirical labor supply literature, time non-separability does not account for the joint behavior of hours, wages, and consumption in the data (Mankiw et al., 1989) .
condition (which is also referred to as the Frisch labor-supply function):
(1) Figure 1 shows the cyclical components of total hours worked (H) and two measures of marginal disutility (W/C) from working for U.S. for 1964:I-2003:II (detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter). The hours worked represent the total hours employed in the nonagricultural business sector. The two measures for marginal disutility differ in wage measures:
these being the labor productivity of non-agricultural business sector (Y /H) and the real hourly earnings of the production and non-supervisory workers (W ). 3 Consumption (C) reflects expenditures on nondurable goods and services. Hours worked often move in the opposite direction to its price, suggesting a serious departure from a stable labor-supply schedule. This is often viewed as a failure of labor-market clearing (more generally, as friction in the labor market) or as the existence of preference shifts.
Under the assumption that the aggregate labor-supply elasticity γ is 1, we compute the implied-or required-time series of preference residual B which accommodates the firstorder condition (1). This elasticity is higher than a typical estimate in the micro data (e.g., MaCurdy, 1981) , which is less than 0.5. If we assume an inelastic labor supply (a smaller value of γ), we obtain a bigger residual. 4 Conversely, an elastic labor supply produces a smaller residual. Nevertheless, the particular value of aggregate elasticity does not alter the conclusion of the paper. Figure 2 shows the time series of preference residual along with the hours worked. This is highly correlated with the labor supply, and its volatility is in the 3 While the real hourly earning is a more relevant measure, the wage data at quarterly frequency is limited to those of production and non-supervisory workers only. Following Hall (1997) , we use labor productivity for the rest of this paper. The conclusion and main results of this paper do not depend on the choice of wage measure.
4 For example, Hall (1997) uses γ = 1/1.7.
same order of magnitude as hours worked. 5 A strong interpretation of this residual would be shifts in the marginal rate of substitution between commodity consumption and leisure at the aggregate level, while a weak interpretation would be labor-market frictions, or the extent to which the labor market deviates from a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we note that two important premises in the calculation of the preference residual are: a competitive labor market and aggregation. While we focus solely on the latter, this does not necessarily reflect our views on the importance of a non-competitive labor market. Rather we simply maintain the competitive labor market to highlight the aggregation problem. In the next section, we present a model economy in which the preference residual arises as an aggregation error.
The Model
There is a continuum (measure one) of workers who have identical preferences but different productivity. Individual productivity varies exogenously according to a stochastic process with a transition probability distribution function π x (x |x) = Pr(x t+1 ≤ x |x t = x). A worker maximizes his utility over consumption c t and hours worked h t :
subject to
Workers trade claims for physical capital, a t , which yields the rate of return r t and depreciates at the rate δ. The capital market is incomplete. Physical capital is the only asset available to workers who face a borrowing constraint: a t ≥ā for all t. Based on Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) , we abstract from the intensive margin, and assume that the labor supply is indivisible; i.e., h t takes either zero orh(< 1). If employed, a worker supplies h units of labor and earns w t x th , where w t is wage rate per effective unit of labor. 6
The representative firm produces output according to a constant-returns-to-scale CobbDouglas technology in capital, K t , and efficiency units of labor,
where λ t is the aggregate productivity shock with a transition probability distribution func-
The value function for an employed worker, denoted by V E , is:
where T denotes a transition operator that defines the law of motion for the distribution of workers µ (a, x) . 9 The value function for a non-employed worker, denoted by V N (a, x; λ, µ) , is defined similarly with h = 0. Then, the labor-supply decision is characterized by:
Equilibrium consists of a set of value functions,
a set of decision rules for consumption, asset holdings, and labor supply, {c (a, x; λ, µ) ,
r(λ, µ)}, and a law of motion for the distribution µ = T(λ, µ) such that:
1. Individuals optimize:
Given w(λ, µ) and r(λ, µ), the individual decision rules c (a, x; λ, µ), a (a, x; λ, µ) , and
2. The representative firm maximizes profits:
for all (λ, µ).
The goods market clears:
Factor markets clear:
5. Individual and aggregate behaviors are consistent:
for all A 0 ⊂ A and X 0 ⊂ X .
Quantitative Analysis

Calibration
We briefly explain the choice of the model parameters. The unit of time is a business quarter.
We assume that x follows an AR(1) process: ln x = ρ x ln x + ε x , where ε x ∼ N (0, σ 2 x ). As we view x as reflecting a broad measure of earnings ability in the market, we estimate the We search for the weight parameter on leisure, B, such that the steady state employment rate is 60 percent, the CPS average for 1967:II-2000:IV. The discount factor β is chosen so that the quarterly rate of return to capital is one percent. Aggregate productivity shock, λ t , follows an AR(1) process: ln λ = ρ λ ln λ + ε λ , where ε λ ∼ N (0, σ 2 λ ). We set ρ λ = 0.95 and σ λ = 0.007 following Kydland and Prescott (1982) . Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of the benchmark economy.
Cross-sectional Earnings and Wealth Distribution
As we investigate the aggregation issue, it is desirable for the model economy to possess a reasonable amount of heterogeneity. We compare cross-sectional earnings and wealth-two important observable dimensions of heterogeneity in the labor market-found in the model and in the data. In both the data and the model, the poorest 20 percent of families in terms of wealth distribution was found to own virtually nothing. In fact, households in the first quintile of wealth distribution were found to be in debt in both the model and the data. The PSID found that households in the 4th and 5th quintile own 18.74 and 76.22 percent of total wealth, respectively, while, according to the model, they own 23.88 and 65.49 percent, respectively.
The average wealth of those in the 4th and 5th quintile is respectively, 0.93 and 3.81 times larger than that of a typical household, according to the PSID. These ratios are 1.19 and 3.27 according to our model. The 4th and 5th quintile groups of the wealth distribution earn, respectively, 24.21 and 38.23 percent of total earnings, according to the PSID. The corresponding groups earn 23.59 and 32.63 percent, respectively, in the model.
Overall, wealth distribution is found to be more skewed in the data. In particular, our model fails to match the highly concentrated wealth found in the right tail of the distribution.
In the PSID, the top 5 percent of the population controls about half of total wealth (not shown in Table 2 ). Whereas, in our model, they possess only 20 percent of the total wealth. Our primary objective is not to explain the behavior of the top 1 or 5 percent of the population.
Therefore, we argue that the model economy presented in this paper possesses a reasonable degree of heterogeneity, thus making it possible to study the effects of aggregation in the labor market.
Cyclical Properties of the Model
We numerically solve the equilibrium of the model using the "bounded rationality" method developed by Krusell and Smith (1998) , and generate the aggregate time series through
simulations. 11 Table 3 shows the volatility of the key aggregate variables of our model economy. In the face of aggregate productivity shocks whose stochastic process resembles that of the U.S. TFP, the model-output exhibits a volatility of 1.18, slightly less than two thirds of actual-output volatility. This is not very different from the findings of the standard representative-agent models (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1982) . Other statistics are also similar to those found in the standard models: consumption is about half as volatile as output and investment is about three to four times as volatile as output.
One distinguishing feature of our model is the labor market. The (relative) volatility of hours and productivity is very close to those found in the data, which is hard to achieve in a standard model unless unreasonably high labor-supply elasticity is assumed. The volatility of hours relative to output is 0.71 (0.85 in the data), and the volatility of labor productivity relative to output is 0.66 (0.50 in the data). This success is mostly due to the composition effect generated by the entry and exit of workers with heterogeneous productivity. On average, less-productive workers participate in the labor market during expansions and exit during contractions. The measured hours are more volatile than the hours in effective units and the aggregate wage is less volatile than individual wages. When we measure the hours worked in effective units, these are about half as volatile as output (0.41), similar to the result when using the representative-agent model with standard preferences. Table 4 demonstrates the correlations. The correlations between output, consumption, and investment are higher than those in the data, a feature common in standard RBC models.
However, the correlations of hours and labor productivity, respectively, with output are 0.84 and 0.73, close to those in the data. In particular, hours and labor productivity exhibit a fairly low correlation (0.23) in our model -it is 0.03 in the data. This is encouraging because it is well known that one of the most salient failures of the RBC models is its failure to generate a low correlation between hours and labor productivity in the data.
Preference Residual from the Model
If we were to use the competitive equilibrium of a representative agent to account for the model-generated aggregate time series of hours, wages, and consumption, we would face the same problem: the hours worked and the marginal disutility from working do not co-move.
To illustrate we compute the preference residual from the model-generated aggregate time series. Figure 3 shows total hours worked and the preference residual from the model (under the assumption that the labor supply elasticity is 1, which was also assumed for the actual data).
In terms of the second moments of Hodrick-Prescott filtered data, the residual from the model exhibits stochastic properties similar to those found in the data. The standard deviation of the residual relative to output is 0.91 (1.23 in the data). In absolute terms, the residual in the model is about half as volatile as the one found in the data. The correlation between the residual and total hours worked is -0.90 (-0.92 in the data). The correlation between hours and measured marginal disutility of working (W/C) is -0.27 (-0.53 in the data).
Despite there being no inherent preference shifts (in the face of aggregate technology shocks) the model generates an aggregation error that looks very similar to the preference residual in the data. Our results caution against viewing the preference residual as the fundamental driving force of business cycles, as well as against the view that the residual reflects a failure of labor-market clearing.
Role of Incomplete Market and Indivisible Labor
The residual in our model stems from capital market incompleteness and indivisible labor supply. To investigate the marginal contributions of each, we consider three additional model economies. For comparison, we refer to the benchmark economy as HII which stands for "Heterogeneity-Incomplete Market-Indivisible Labor." The equilibrium of this economy is identical to the allocation made by a social planner who maximizes the equally weighted utility of the population. The planner chooses the sequence of consumption {C t } ∞ t=0 and the cut-off productivity {x * t } ∞ t=0 for labor-market participation. To assure an efficient allocation, the planner assigns workers who have a comparative advantage in the market (more productive workers) to work. If a worker's productivity is above x * t , he suppliesh hours of labor.
Alternative Model Specifications
The planner's value function in the complete market, V C (K, λ), and the decision rules for consumption, C(K, λ), and cut-off productivity, x * (K, λ), satisfy the following Bellman equation:
where L =h ∞ x * xφ(x)dx is the aggregate efficiency unit of labor, and φ(x) is the productivity distribution of workers. The planner chooses the cut-off productivity x * so that:
The left-hand side is the (society's) utility gain from assigning the marginal worker to production. There are φ(x * ) number of workers with productivity x * in the economy. Each of them supplieshx * units of effective labor, and the marginal product of labor is F L . The right-hand side represents the disutility incurred by these workers. The key point here is that, under complete markets, the first-order condition for the choice between hours and consumption is exactly defined in terms of the efficiency units of hours and wages at the aggregate level. Thus, the preference residual reflects the composition bias in wages and hours.
In other words, the aggregate preference residual in this economy can always be eliminated by an appropriate choice of aggregate labor-supply elasticity. This is discussed in detail in section 5.2.
Heterogeneity + Incomplete Market + Divisible Labor (HID)
The third model economy we consider allows for a divisible labor supply, but capital markets are incomplete:
"Heterogeneity-Incomplete Market-Divisible Labor (HID)". The equilibrium of this economy can be defined similarly to that of HII in Section 3-equations (5) through (10) 
Representative-Agent Model (RA) The last model we consider is the "RepresentativeAgent (RA)" model. The value function of the representative agent, V R (K, λ), is:
Comparison of Four Model Economies
Except for β and B, the same parameter values are used across all models. In the RA model, β is 0.99 and B is chosen so that the steady-state hours worked is the same as the aggregate hours in the benchmark economy, which is 0.2 (=h × 60%). For HCI, β is 0.99 and B is chosen to be consistent with 60% employment along withh = 1/3. The preference residuals are computed using an aggregate labor-supply elasticity of 0.4
for the divisible-labor economies (RA and HID), which is the same as the individual elasticity.
When the labor supply is indivisible the aggregate labor-supply elasticity can be very different from the individual elasticity. In the complete market economy (HCI), the aggregate labor supply is governed by (13); whereas, in the incomplete market economy (HII), it is dependent on the shape of the reservation wage distribution. We compute the residuals assuming that the aggregate elasticity of HII and HCI is 1 for two reasons. First, it allows for a direct comparison with the residual from the data in section 2. Moreover, according to Chang and Kim (2004) , a model economy similar to HII exhibits an aggregate labor-supply elasticity 13 Specifically, we find the steady-state cut-off productivity, x * , from the 60th percentile of cross-sectional productivity distribution, φ(x):
R ∞ x * xφ(x)dx = 0.6. Then, find B that satisfies the labor supply equation, (13).
of around 1 in the steady state. Nevertheless, the choice of a particular aggregate elasticity does not alter the main conclusions of this paper. Figure 4 shows the sample paths (percentage deviations from the steady states) of the various models' preference residuals. These sample paths are comparable to each other because all model economies are subject to an identical sequence of aggregate productivity shocks. As expected, there is no preference residual in RA. The residual in HID represents an aggregation error that has been caused solely by market incompleteness. The residual in HCI reflects this model's compositional bias in aggregate hours and wages. Apparently, these residuals are not large enough to account for the preference residual in the data. The volatilities of the residual relative to output are 0.13 for both HID and HCI, which are, respectively, only one tenth of that found in the data (1.23). In this sense, our result contrasts with Mulligan (2001) in which the indivisible labor yields aggregate implications that are not very distinctive from those of representative-agent divisible-labor model economy.
Capital-market incompleteness alone does not generate a large aggregation error. With divisible labor, in response to aggregate productivity shocks, hours are highly correlated across households, allowing for a fairly precise aggregation. On the other hand, with indivisible labor (e.g., Rogerson, 1988; Hansen, 1985) , the intra-temporal optimality condition for the choice between commodity consumption and leisure does not hold for most households, resulting in a serious aggregation errors. While this is true even when the capital market is complete, the consumption-hours choice holds exactly in efficiency units at the aggregate level under complete capital market-recall Equation (13). Thus, the preference residual reflects the measurement error due to composition effect in aggregate wages and hours.
It is well-known that low-wage and less-skilled workers enter the labor market during expansions and exit during recessions, making the aggregate hours more volatile than the effective unit of hours (Hansen, 1993) , and making the aggregate wages less volatile than individual wages (Bils, 1985; Solon et. al 1989) . 14 However, the compositional bias has an impact mostly on the volatilities, not on the correlations. 15 In other words, around the steady state (if the cutoff productivity is not far from steady-state x * ), the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure holds with an appropriately chosen aggregate labor elasticity: the preference residual in HCI reflects the mis-specification error in aggregate labor-supply elasticity. In fact, if we assume aggregate labor-supply elasticity of 1.44 in HCI, there is virtually no preference residual. The preference residual in the data arises not only because wages (more exactly, wage-consumption ratio) move little relative to hours worked, but also because they are not strongly correlated with hours over the business cycle. Thus, from the data (as well as in HII), we find the preference residual regardless of aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
The preference residual arises when aggregate hours move more relative to the measured marginal disutility of working (with γ = 1,
. We compare each component-hours, wages, and consumption-across the models. Figure 5 shows total hours worked (percentage deviations from the steady states). The hours worked in HID move similarly to those in RA, whereas the hours worked in indivisible labor economies (HII and HCI) fluctuate much more than those in RA. This suggests that with regards to the volatility of hours, indivisible labor 14 Bils (1985) and Solon et al. (1995) , based on the individual panel data, find that aggregate wages are less cyclical than individual wages. Hansen (1993) computes the effective unit of hours based on the worker characteristics provided by the CPS. He finds that while the effective unit of hours adjusted for quality exhibits a bigger volatility, such an adjustment does not change the cyclical property of hours significantly. In practice, estimating quality-adjusted hours is not easy in practice as observed characteristics account for only a fraction of worker's productivity. For example, the R 2 of cross-sectional wage regression is usually well below 0.4.
is more important than incomplete markets. The hours worked fluctuate more in HII than they do in HCI. Under incomplete markets, high-skilled workers (as well as the low-skilled) perform intertemporal substitution in labor-market participation; whereas, under complete markets, only workers at the margin-whose productivity is around x * in (13)-enter and exit the labor market in response to shifts in aggregate productivity. This can be seen more clearly when we measure the hours of work in effective units ( Figure 6 ). The effective unit of hours is more volatile in HII than it is in HCI. Note also that, despite indivisible labor, the cyclical behavior of the effective unit of hours in HCI is almost identical to that of the RA. Finally, the aggregate labor-supply curve depends on the shape of the reservation-wage distribution, which, in turn, is dependent on the cross-sectional wealth distribution. As the wealth distribution of an economy changes, the response of the aggregate labor supply and of consumption varies over time.
Confronted with the inability of the standard equilibrium model to account for the joint behavior of aggregate hours worked, wages, and consumption, Mankiw et al. (1985) proposed four hypotheses: (1) measurement errors (2) aggregation (3) time-varying preference (4) failure of market clearing. While it is highly plausible that all of these have contributed to the measured preference residual, our analysis sheds some lights on these hypotheses: measurement errors (1) due to composition effect is not enough; (2) can be mis-interpreted as (3); the residual does not necessarily reflect (4).
Summary
The cyclical behavior of aggregate hours worked, wages, and consumption is hard to reconcile with the equilibrium outcome of the representative-agent model with standard preference. A significant preference residual can be measured when employing an accounting method that uses aggregate time series in conjunction with the optimality condition. We demonstrate that a heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor can generate an aggregation error that is quantitatively comparable the preference residual in the data. With indivisible labor, the intra-temporal optimality condition for the choice between commodity consumption and leisure does not hold at the household level. Under a situation of incomplete markets, this results in a serious aggregation error at the aggregate level. In addition, the aggregate labor-supply curve is not time-invariant, as the reservationwage distribution changes over the business cycle. Our results caution against viewing this residual as a fundamental driving force of business cycles or as a failure of labor-market clearing. Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shock σ x = 0.287
Standard deviation of innovation to idiosyncratic productivity ρ λ = 0.95
Persistence of aggregate productivity shock σ λ = 0.007
Standard deviation of innovation to aggregate productivity 
